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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEERY AND HILTON TRAVEL 
SERVICES, INC., 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
Case No. 15219 
CAPITOL INTERNATIONAL 
AIRI'IAYS, INC., 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
A review of Respondent's Brief reflects a maze of 
supposition and conjecture as to what Capitol thought the 
parties intended with respect to Charter Flight 485, 
without citation to the record as to what the evidence was 
and what the jury found in the trial below. 
POINT I 
CAPI~OL HAS CITED NO AUTHORITY REQUIRING 
DEERY TO EXHAUST EVERY CONCEIVABLE ALTERNATIVE 
IN DISCHARGING ITS DUTY TO MITIGATE DAMAGES 
Capitol has cited a number of cases from Utah and 
other jurisdictions to show that DeEry had a duty to reasonably 
mitigate its damages. With this proposition and standard 
D0Bry is in total agreement, DeBry was charged with the 
duty to act reasonably to minimize its loss and the jury 
should lLl':~' bvul so instructed. 
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However, the trial court did not instruct the jur7 
that DeEry had a duty to reasonably mitigate damages. 
Rather, the trial court instructed the jury that DeEry had 
an absolute duty to find the cheapest alternate trans porta:~: 
and to flawlessly and perfectly mitigate its damages. 
The instruction in pertinent part was, If you 
find that the Plaintiff could have found a cheaper or more 
economical way of flying the flight but that he failed to 
do so, then the Plaintiff would not be entitled to claim 
the excess damages. (R. 586, Brief of AppelL:tnt, :J. 
10, 11.) In other words, DeEry had the absolute duty to 
find the cheapest or most economical charter flight in the 
world. If DeEry did not do so, it was to be penalized and 
was, in fact, penalized in excess of Thirteen '::":1ousand 
Dollars ( $13, 0 0 0. 0 0 i . 
Capitol has not cited one case to this Court, nor diG 
Capitol cite any case to the trial court in support of the 
standard stated in the Court's instruction. 
POINT II 
DEERY DID REASONABLY MITIGATE DAH.i\GES 
After Capitol refused to fly the charter, DeEry sent 
the tour group on Air Canada. 
Canada had the cheapest tickets he could finJ (Tr. G~66, 
first day.) 
Capitol did not put on any evidence to show th~: t' 
cost of the .i'lir Canaua tic::-:ets was hiCjh or unr,~·cb•'ll 1:-
-2-
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~or does Capitol's briGf contend that the cost of the Air 
canada tickets was high or unrGasonable. In short, Capitol 
seems to agree that Air Canada was a "reasonable alternative". 
capitol's only argument is that Air Canada was not the 
cheapest and most economical alternative. Under Capitol's 
theory, DeEry should have been required to contact and fly 
the Saturn flight. (Brief of Respondent, p. 20, 21.) 
Indeed, under Capitol's theory, DeEry would be required 
as a matter of law to contact every air carrier without 
limitation that could provide air transportation from New 
York to London on November 22, 1974 and return December 9, 
1974 (Ex. 3-P) so that the cheapest and most economical 
means of air carriage could be determined. Such a requirement 
cannot be supported under any test of reasonableness. 
Noreovcr, the standard advocated by Capital would be applicable 
and DeDry would be penalized even though DeEry had only 
twenty-two (22) days to mitigate inasmuch as Capitol did not 
repudiate the contract until October 30, 1974. (R. 46, ~3.) 
Such a conclusion flies in the teeth of the standard urged 
by both parties and supported by all the cases that DeEry 
was only requirGd to use rGasonable efforts to mitigate its 
damagcs. 
UndGr the instruction given by the Court, the jury had 
no choice but to find the way it did on thG issue of mitigation. 
-3-
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Therefore, if this Court holds that DeEry had an 
absolute duty to find the cheapest alternative, DeEry's 
damages would be measured by the difference between the 
Capitol contract price and the Saturn flight, or Eight 
Thousand One Hundred Seventy Dollars ($8,170.00). (Brief a: 
Respondent, p. 21.) Such a holding would ignore the testix 
of Mr. Sachs received by the Court over the objection of 
Debry (Tr. pgs. 5, 6, 7, 8, and ll, fourth day) that the 
Saturn flight was available only up to the first week of 
October, 1974 (Tr. ll, fourth day) and the fact that DeBr/s 
duty to mitigate did not arise until the 30th day of Octobe:, 
1974, (the date Capitol repudiated the contract for Charter 
Flight 485 by which time the Saturn charter was no longer 
available.) However, if this Court holds that DeEry had a 
duty to find a reasonable alternative, the damages should~ 
measured by the difference between the Capitol contract 
price and the Air Canada flight or Twenty-One Thousand Six 
Hundred Fifty-Three Dollars Twenty-Nine Cents ($21, 653. 29) · 
(Brief of Appellant, p. 8.) 
POINT III 
DEERY IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES AS A RESULT 
OF CAPITOL'S BREACH OF ITS DUTIES AS A COMMON CARRIER 
Capitol offers no rebuttal to and apparently chooses 
ignore the jury's damage award based upon DeEry's claim t~-
Capitol breached its duties to Deilry as a common carrier. 
Apparently, Capitol concedes that claim. 
-4-
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capitol has not made any assignment of error on the common 
carrler claim. The jury found that Capitol had breached its 
duties and obligations to DeEry and that DeEry was damaged 
as a result thereof. (Brief of Appellant, p. 10; Inter-
rogatories 7. and 8.) 
Since liability was predicated on the common carrier 
claim by the jury, it is not necessary for this Court to 
consider the contract issues. ?he Court can base its damage 
award entirely on the common carrier claim. 1 I 
DeEry has responded to the arguments advanced by Capitol 
with respect to the contract claim in the attached Appendix. 
If this Court rests liability on the common carrier claim, 
the Appendix can be ignored. If, however, this Court 
determines to address the contract issues, the Appendix 
should be considered. 
POINT IV 
DEBRY SHOULD BE Ah'ARDED REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Capitol argues that ". . DeEry has misconstrued the 
use of the 'bad faith' exception in allowing attorney's fees 
(Brief of Respondent, pg. 22.) A recent explanation 
of the rule is found in the case of Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 
l, 35 L.Ed.2d 702, 93 S.Ct. 1943 (1973): 
l I As a common carrier, Capitol had a statutory duty to 
ITy the tour whether there was a contract or not. 49 U.S.C.A. 
H374 {a) (1) (b). Furthermore, a common carrier has a duty 
under Utah law to communicate with potential passengers. A 
cc)mmon carr icr cannot stand in silence when a potential 
~1sscngcr rcqu~sts passage. Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. v. 
11-.Jl''•:L & Hio <3rancle Co., 60 Utah 153, 207 P. 155 (1922). 
':T,~_::;-;--t-~ur~· founcl that Capitol had breached its duty as a 
,~~01u;1un c.H-rhcr when C.:1pitol kept the deposit for Charter 
rhght 485 !Jut rcfuscu to communicate with DeEry to confirm 
or cJ,~ny the flic;ht. 
-5-
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Although the traditional ABerican 
rule ordinarily disfavors the allowance 
of attorneys' fees in the absence of 
statutory or contractual authorization, 
federal courts, in the exercise of their 
equitable powers, may award attorneys' fees 
when the interests of justice so require. 
Indeed, the power to award such fees 'is 
part of the original authority of the 
chancellor to do equity in a particular 
situation,' [citation omitted], and 
federal courts do not hesitate to exercise 
this inherent equitable power whenever 
'overriding considerations indicate the 
need for such a recovery.' [citations 
omitted]. 
Thus, it is unquestioned that a 
federal court may award counsel fees to 
a successful party when his opponent has 
acted 'in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, 
or for oppressive reasons.' [citations 
omitted] In this class of cases, the under-
lying rationale of 'fee shifting' is, of 
course, punitive, and the essential element 
in triggering the award of fees is therefore 
the existence of 'bad faith' on the part 
of the unsuccessful litigant. 
412 U.S. 1, 4, 5, 36 L.Ed. 2d 702, 707. 
The Court went on to note: 
Petitioners also contend that the award 
of attorneys' fees in this case was improper 
because the District Court, in denying respond-
ent's claim for punitive damages, found that 'the 
defendants, in good faith, believed that they 
had a right to charge and discipline [respondent] 
for his actions.' It is clear, however, that 
'bad faith' may be found, not only in actions 
that led to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct 
of the litigation. And, as the Court of Ap 
peals noted, the conduct of this particular 
litigation was marked by the 'dilatory action 
of the union and its officers . 
412, U.S. 1, 15, 36 L.Ed.2d 702, 713 [emphasis added]. 
-6-
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Capitol argues that the alleged bad faith in the instant 
case is "little more than run of the mill litigation 
(Brief of Respondent, p. 25) and suggests that DeBry may be 
guilty of bad faith due to the institution of other suits 
against Capitol. (Brief of Respondent, p. 25). The trial 
court permitted evidence of other litigation over numerous 
objections of DeEry's counsel and finally a continuing 
objection to the receipt of such evidence. (Tr. 20, second 
day.) Debry thereafter took an exception concerning the 
admissibility of evidence of such prior lawsuits on the 
grounds that the same were not only immaterial, irrelevant 
and incompetent, but were prejudicial to DeBry. (Tr. 38, 
fourth day) . 
DeBry suggests that it was not "run of the mill" for 
Capitol's lawyer, M~. Topham, during the course of this 
litigation to misrepresent the facts concerning the existence 
and whereabouts of the key contract between the parties. 
(Tr. 17-18, third day, Brief of Appellant, p. 23.) l_/ After 
two (2) years of extensive litigation, research, discovery 
and in the middle of the trial, Capitol finally stipulated 
that it was a common carrier. This lengthy and expensive 
~/See, United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 412 F.Supp. 
705 (1976), where the plaintiffs were awarded $200,000 in 
atlorncy's fees on the grounds that the concealment of 
certain materials were part of a course of conduct adopted 
(the defendant] in bad faith for the sole purpose of 
iny the final resolution of the controversy. 
-7-
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litigation could have been shortened and more easily resol~ 
had Capitol "fessed up" in the beginning. 
DeEry further suggests that it was not "run of the 
mill" for Capitol to adopt the spurious defense that it was 
not a common carrier when it knew full well it was and 
finally in the middle of trial so stipulated. l_/ 
The purpose for awarding attorney's fees under such 
circumstances is obvious and compelling. There is no quest:: 
but that under the "American Rule" a litigant must incur anc 
bear the expense of his own attorneys' fees. Alyeska Pipel1· 
Service Co. v. Vililderness Society, 421 U.S. 240; 44 L.r:d. :: 
141; 95 S.Ct. 1612 (1975). However, it goes without sayir.s 
that a wealthy litigant can, by unfair tactics, grind an 
opponent into submission. Indeed, a vexatious litigant 
could very easily lose an individual case but win the war. 
For example, it is entirely possible that a plaintiff coulc 
win an award of only $8,170.00 at an expense of twice ~hat 
sum in attorney's fees. 
Capitol's bad faith conduct has unfairly prolonged ar.c 
delayed this litigation. These tactics constitute taking ~ 
3 I Capitol is by statutory definition a co~~on carrier. 
See, Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.,\. §1301. "'InterstJt~ 
air transportation', 'overseas air transportation', c-u1c1 
'foreign air transportation' respectively, mean thP carr 
as a cor,1mon carrier for compensation or hire . " 
[Emphasis added.] See also, Rule ll, C.R.C.P. 
-----
-8-
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unfair advantage of the Plaintiff and serve as an abuse and 
expense to the judicial system. This Court should follow 
the lead of the federal courts to penalize such conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant therefore submits that this Court should 
grant the relief sought by the Appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~·· 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
Twelfth Floor 
310 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 363-3300 
-9-
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APPENDIX 
POINT I 
THE PARTIES ENTERED INTO A BINDING AND 
ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT AND THE JURY SO FOUND 
As a general proposition, the formation of a contract 
is determined by the existence of an offer, an acceptance 
and consideration. In the instant case, there is no question 
as to the payment of consideration by DeEry and none has 
been raised by Capitol: Indeed, it is admitted that Capitol 
received and retained the sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) 
from DeEry (One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) to be applied 
to Charter Flight 485) and that this amount was not returned 
by Capitol until long after this case was instituted. (Tr. 
82, third day.) When an offer and an acceptance are ac-
curately determined, the issue of the existence of a contract 
is resolved. 
The language of the Restatement of Contracts is helpful 
by way of background: 
An offer is the manifestation of 
willingness to enter into a bargain so 
made as to justify another person in un-
derstanding that his assent to that bargain 
is invited and will conclude it. 
Restatement of Contracts 2d, §24. 
On November 27, 1973, following telephone negotiations 
between the parties as to points of departure, destination, 
size of aircraft, price, dates and the assignment of a 
C:\:HlL'r flight number, Capitol mailed a contract form drafted 
A-l 
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by Capitol with a covering letter to DeBry with all blanks 
filled in by Capitol, except for the signature blocks. (E::. 
2-P and 3-P) On November 30, 1973 DeBry executed and re-
turned the contract together with a covering letter. (Ex. 
4-P.) Capitol kept the deposit but did not return a signed 
copy of the contract. In fact, Capitol did not respond ~ 
DeBry in any way. Capitol now contends that since it did 
not execute the contract, the contract was never consummate: 
between the parties. (Brief of Respondent, Point I.) 
The language of the contract and the negotiations 
between the parties belies Capitol's contentions and the 
transactions between these parties reflects a classic case 
of contract formation. Capitol's signature was never 
necessary to give rise to a binding contract, nor did 
Capitol ever condition the contract upon such a requirement. 
Capitol made a firm offer to DeBry on november 27, 1973 as 
previously confirmed to DeBry and DeBry unconditionally 
accepted the same by executing the contract and returning 1: 
to Capitol within the ten (10) day period required by 
Capitol before the offer expired or was withdrawn. !_/ 
The contract form prepared by Capitol with respect tc 
Charter Flight 485 states in part ". the carrier will 
charter to the Charterer and the Charterer will take on 
charter for the flight, joc.rney, service or period and up.':: 
the terms specified in the Schedule subject to the Condlt: 
l I R. J. Daum Construction Co. v. Child, 122 l:t.Jh 104, _: 
P":"""2d 817 1952) 0 
l\-2 
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set out on the back hereof, to which the Charterer hereby 
agrees and accepts . . if this contract is not signed and 
returned with the full deposit indicated in the Schedule of 
Payments as indicated ten (10) days after issue, the offer 
of Charter Transportation, as indicated, shall automatically 
expire. [Emphasis added.) (Ex. 3-P, first page.) At 
the time of DeEry's acceptance of Capitol's offer by the 
execution of the contract prepared by Capitol, a binding 
contract existed between the parties and the jury so found. 
(Brief of Appellant, page 9; Interrogatories 1. and 2.) 
While there is no requirement in contract law that an offer 
must be signed by the offeror, although DeEry submits that 
the execution by Capitol of its letter (Ex. 2-P) would 
fulfill such a requirement, the fact is that the offer in 
the instant case does not condition DeEry's acceptance upon 
Capitol's ratification, signature or other approval. After 
DeBry accepted Capitol's offer in the specified manner, 
Capitol lost the power to vary the manner in which its offer 
must be accepted and cannot now require ratification or home 
office approval of DeEry's acceptance. See, generally, 
Corbin on Contracts, I Vol. Ed., §38-39 (1952). 
In the present case, Capitol's Aircraft Charter Con-
tract was filled in by Capitol and transmitted to DeEry by 
an officer of capitol authorized to make contracts. It is 
fundamental that DeEry had the power to accept Capitol's 
A- 3 
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offer by executing the contr~ct and returning the same 
within the period required which is exactly what DeBry die. 
The case of ~orton & Lamphere Construction Co. v. 
Blow & Cote, Inc., 183 .-,. 2d, 230 (1962) is squarely in 
point. In that case the plaintiffs were partners in a sand 
and gravel business, and defendant was a contractor. 
Defendant received a sizeable contract award for a road 
construction job. Plaintiffs thereupon contacted defendant 
with respect to furnishing the crushed gravel which defer.:,· 
would require in his road construction. 
After some preliminary negotiations defendant wrote t:.: 
following letter to plaintiff: 
Norton & Lamphere Canst. Co. 
P.O. Box 46, Jericho, Vermont 
Gentlemen: 
\ve enclose herewith throe copies of contract Hhl: 
have been revised per your request. 
The original and copy should be signed by you Jr. 
returned to this office. At which time, we 
will sign the original and return it to you. 
The third copy, which is marked, should be re-
tained for your files. 
V~r~· truly yours, 
BLOW & COTE, INC. 
(Dennis Cote) 
The contract form att~ched to that letter set out 
certain specific~tions ~nd estim~tes for m~teri~ls, i~~:. 
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a completion date. The form contained blank signature 
spaces. The plaintiff executed and mailed the contract to 
the defendant. However, the defendant did not execute nor 
affix his signature on the agreement. Following a dispute, 
plaintiff sued for breach of contract. The defendant 
contended that since he did not execute the agreement he 
was not bound. The court answered that contention as 
follows: 
In the instant case, however, we do have a 
written contract, containing terms, which the 
evidence discloses, had been fully 
agreed upon by both parties. Drawn by the 
defendant, who now seeks to deny it, it was sent 
to the plaintiff who affixed its signature to 
it, thus accepting it. While the defendant did 
not sign the contract, as it had agreed to do, 
the fact is that it had already accepted the 
terms expressed therein and had itself reduced 
them to writing. The accepting and adopting of 
a written contract by a party who has not put 
his name to it, binds such party equally as if 
he had signed such contract. When this contract 
was accepted by the plaintiff, under the cir-
cumstances existing here, it became binding upon 
both parties, the same as if it had been signed 
by both. [citations ommitted] The fact that 
the defendant believed that such contract would 
not be binding upon it without its signature is 
of no consequence. It is a general rule of con-
struction of contracts that the language and 
acts of a party to a contract are to receive such 
a construction as the other party was fairly 
justified in giving to them, and he will not, at 
a later time, be permitted to give them a different 
operation in consequence of some mental reservation. 
Viewing the transaction between the parties 
from a different aspect, the defendant, by reason 
of its letter and proposed contract sent to the 
plaintiff, made plaintiff an offer. The plaintiff 
by signing the proposed contract, accepted the 
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offer. The effect of the acceptance by the 
plaintiff was to make the offer into a binding 
contract between the parties. [citations omitt~dj 
183 A.2d 230, 234, (1962). [Emphasis added.] 
See also Corbin on Contracts, §30 (1950), Smith v. 
Onyx Oil and Chemical Co., 218 F.2 d, 104 (1955); and .1'1tlc2:_'_ 
Banana Co. v. Standard Fruit and Steamship Co .. 493 F.2d 
555, (1974) 0 
The case here under consideration is even stronger t'la:. 
the Norton case. In both cases the defendants failed or 
refused to sign the contracts at issue. 
I 
However, signifi2a::: 
differences exist in the cover letters representing deli~~ 
of the respective offers. In :\lorton the cover letter stat2i, 
"The original and copy should be signed by you and retun.oc 
to this office. At which time we will sign the original 
and return it to you." (Emphasis added.) It can be persuao. 
argued in Norton that the parties anticipated the addi tio:'a~ 
act of the defendant's signature after the plaintiffs had 
signed. 
In the instant case the cover letter spoke in terms o: , 
finality. No additional act was anticipated or required; ;: 
fact, the contracts were not only requested, but confir~ec 
between Capitol and DeEry prior to submission. 
. Here arc the contracts request~d 
and confirmed in my telephone convers:1tion 
with ShL!ron . . I am :J.bL' to hold the<' 
dates onl~· to Deccmlj~r 5, so plc~sc CX!t~d~t~ 
their execution dnd r,•turn . (]:>: . ..:-!) 
l\-6 
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In this case, the intention of the parties is clear 
that a binding contract was contemplated between them. 
Capital prepared, enclosed and confirmed its existence and 
DeBry accepted the same, paid the required consideration and 
reaffirmed its intention to fly Charter Flight 485. (Ex. 7-
P and 8-P.) A review of the record can support no other 
conclusion. 
Notwithstanding the hue and cry now raised by Capitol, 
the essential elements of contract formation were clearly 
present in the instant case and the jury so found. 
POINT II 
C.A.B. REGULATIONS DO NOT CHANGE 
OR ABROGATE THE COM1'10N LAW OF cmlTRACTS 
NOR DID DEERY BP£ACH THE CONTRACT 
The main thrust of Capitol's brief is that the regula-
tions of the Civil Aeronautice Board prevent the enforcement 
of the contract and the DeEry failed to comply with those 
regulations. 
While there is no question as to the right of the Civil 
Aeronautice Board to promulgate regulations to govern air 
carriers, the Act implementing that authority contains 
specific statutory provisions with respect to available 
remedies and provides as follows: 
Section 1506. Remedies Not Exclusive. 
Nothing contained in this Chapter shall in any 
way abridge or alter the remedies now existing 
at conunon L•w or by statute but the provisions 
l>.-7 
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of this Chapter are in addition to such remedies. 
(Public Law Citation omitted) [emphasis added.] 
49 U.S.C.A. §1506. 
\'/hat Capitol is urging this Court to do, is to substlt~: 
for the common law of contracts a new law of contracts as 
dictated by the Federal Civil Aeronautics Board. This 
position is urged notwithstanding the plain language of th• 
Federal statute that the regulations cannot abridge or 
abrogate any common law remedy. 
In essence, Capitol seeks to have this Court declare 
that the regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board should 
be substituted for the common law of contracts. DeBry 
submits that to permit Capitol to shield itself from liabilit 
to DeBry based upon these regulations would be to permit U:2 
C.A.B. to usurp the function of the judicial system in 
determining the legal principles applicable to the formatioc 
of contracts between parties. Certainly, the regulations o: 
the C.A.B. do not contemplate such a result. 
Even if there were some technical requirements in order 
to comply with the regulations, Capitol itself could have 
applied for a waiver pursuant to Section 378.30, but appar~ 
chose not to do so: 
378.30. Waiver. 
A waiver of any of the provisions of this 
regulation may be granted by the Board upon 1ts 
own initiative, or upon the submission bv 
A-S 
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a supplemental air carrier of a written request 
therefor, provided that such a waiver is in the 
public interest and it appears to the Board that 
special or unusual circumstances warrant a depar-
ture from the provisions set forth herein. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Capitol has argued that DeEry breached certain conditions 
of the contract, thus excusing Capitol from performance. 
(Brief of Respondent, p. 8.) Specifically, Capitol contends 
that DeEry did not file a ''tour prosepctus" with the Civil 
Aeronautics Board. Capitol contends that since no tour 
prospectus was filed, Capitol could not fly the charter 
flight. 
The applicable C.A.E. regulations are as follows: 
Procedure. (a) No inclusive tour or series of 
tours shall be operated, nor shall any tour 
oeprator or foreign tour operator sell, or offer 
to sell, or solicit persons to participate in, or 
otherwise advertise such tour or tours, or receive 
any money from any prospective participant in 
connection therewith, until at least fifteen days 
after he and the direct air carrier have jointly 
filed with the Board (Supplemenatry Services 
Division, Bureau of Operating Rights), in duplicate 
a tour prospectus, satisfying the requirements of 
Section 378.13. [Emphasis added.] 
C.A.B. Regulation 378.10 
The prospectus shall be filed in duplicate and 
shall include two copies of the following: The 
charter contract, the contract between the tour 
operator or foreign tour operator and tour par-
ticipants, the tour operator's . . surety bond 
. and, where applicable, two copies of 
the depository agreement with a bank . 
C.A.D. Regulation 378.13 
A-9 
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Capitol's argument is very curious. §378.10 of the 
Regulation states that this must be a "joint" filing. The 
record shows that Capitol refused to communicate with DeBr]' 
for nearly ten months, and further, DeBry requested materia~' 
from Capitol for the filing but Capitol refused to respond 
or provide filing materials. (Ex. 9-P and llP.) It is not 
clear how DeBry was supposed to individually do a "joint" 
filing when Capitol refused to even communicate with DeBry, 
Indeed, §378.13 of the Regulation provides that the 
initial document required for such a filing is "the char~r 
contract". DeBry could not even begin the filing process 
because Capitol had the contract. In fact, ten months after 
DeBry signed the contract, Capitol's lawyer stated, "I have 
been unable . . to locate any contract forms for the 
proposed flights." (Ex. 26-P.) 
This Court has recently observed that: "We accept the 
correctness of the proposition that there is implied in any 
contract a covenant of good faith and cooperation, which 
should prevent either party from impeding the other's 
performance of his obligations thereunder and that one part; i 
may not render it difficult or impossible for the other W 
continue performance and then take advantage of tho non-
performance he has caused." Zions Propc>rtics, Inc. v.~' 
538 P. 2d 1319 (Utah 1975). 
A-10 
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Capitol should not be permitted to hinder or impede the 
c.A.B. filing, and then be excused from its contractual 
obligations because no filing was made. 
A-ll 
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Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that two (2) copies of the foregoing 
Reply Brief of Appellant DeBry and Hilton Travel Services, 
Inc. were served upon the Defendant and Respondent, Capitol 
International Airways, Inc. by mailing the same, postage 
prepaid, to Philip R. Fishler, Strong & Hanni, 605 Boston 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this ~ay of 
November, 1977. 
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ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES TO SUPPLEMENT 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Point I, Page 2 
The instruction given by the trial court was, at best, confusing, 
misleading and indeed improper. 1 Under such circumstances, the general 
rule is that is is error to give instructions which tend to mislead 
or confuse the jury. See, 88 C.J.S. Trial §338, 75 Am.Jur.2d §624, 
and 1 Reid Branson, Instructions to Juries, 3d Ed., §104. This Court 
has followed the general rule since 1917. Sorenson v. Bell, 51 Utah 
262, 170 P. 72 (1917), and Lund v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 12 
Utah 2d 268, 365 P.2d 633 (1961). In Sorenson, the Supreme Court 
opined: 
The district court no doubt had in mind correct 
principles of law when it framed the instruction, 
but in stating those principles it used language 
which cast a burden on plaintiffs which the law 
does not require of them. The instruction is there-
fore clearly erroneous. [Emphasis added] 170 P. 72,74. 
In the instant case, as in Sorenso~ the instruction given by the 
trial court placed a burden on DeBry which the law does not require, 
i.e., that DeBry find the cheapest and most economical flight, and that 
failing, DeBry could not recover excess damages. 
The test for the correctness of an instruction does not lie in 
the indulgence which a lawyer in his office, with the aid of his books, 
or the trial and appellate courts with the benefit of briefs and 
l 
R. 586, previously cited as Instruction No. 20, now designated as 
Instruction No. 2 8. 
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arguments of counsel, give to instructions, but as to how the instruc-
tions will naturally be understood by average men composing juries. 
88 c.J.S. Trial §338, pp. 894-895. Here the jury concluded that 
DeEry could not recover the full amount of the damages it sustained 
and the jury could have reached no other conclusion under the incor-
rect mandate given by the trial court. 
-2-
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